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Abstract
Patents are typically characterized as very valuable assets for firms. Nevertheless,
there are many patents in a firm’s portfolio that are actually never used. In this paper, we
claim that there is a relationship between a firm’s decision to use or not to use a patent and
the characteristics of the underlying invention. We characterize patent use according to the
“sleeping” or “non-sleeping” character of the patents in the firm’s portfolio. We characterize
the underlying invention along different dimensions captured by the patent, i.e. importance,
strategic fit, scope and innovativeness. We perform an empirical analysis on a set of patent-
active  firms  in  the  chemicals  industry  that  trade  some  of  their  patents  through  what  is
currently  the  only  website  specialized  in  firm  technology  transfer  through  the  Internet,
yet2.com. We use The NBER Patent Citations Data File to obtain information about the
patents granted to these firms. Our results suggest that sleeping patents are more innovative,
broader and no less important than their counterparts. We conclude that such patents are
worth “waking up”, especially when the underlying invention is applicable to business areas
far away from the patentholder’s strategic core. These results suggest that there is potential
for markets for technology to develop. 
Keywords: patents, innovativeness SLEEPING PATENTS: ANY REASON TO WAKE UP? (1)
Introduction
“The Bell Laboratory’s most significant invention of the past 50 years was the
transistor,  which  created  the  modern  electronics  industry.  But  the  telephone
company saw so little use for this revolutionary new device that it practically gave it
away  to  anybody  who  asked  for  it  –  which  is  what  put  Sony,  and  with  it  the
Japanese, into the consumer-electronics business.”
The Economist, Nov. 1st 2001
The above quote illustrates two well-known facts about invention processes. First, a
given  technology  may  be  (more)  useful  outside  the  sector  and/or  the  firm  where  it  was
originally developed. Second, if this is true, then re-invention is very likely to occur unless
there is inter and intra-sectorial technology transfer.
However, technology transfer is not usual. In many cases, technologies lie under- or
unexploited  on  company  shelves.  This  may  result  in  duplication  of  inventive  efforts  or
technologies that never reach the market. According to the European Patent Office (2001),
duplication of inventive efforts costs the European Union $20 billion each year. Moreover,
some industry estimates suggest that a patent-intensive company may shelve up to 70% of its
patents, a proxy for inventive activity. Under- and non-exploitation has become especially
striking  nowadays,  when  knowledge  needed  in  one  sector  may  come  from  a  completely
unrelated sector. In fact, recent estimates indicate that some companies have begun to transfer
technology  –embodied  in  (neglected)  intellectual  property  assets–  to  outside  industries.
According to The McKinsey Quarterly (2002, Number 4), 10% of the patent portfolio of a
company  with  at  least  450  patents  and  $50  million  spent  in  R&D  expenses  may  be
transferred to outside industries. There are a lot of examples of technologies coming from
external industries: the fibreglass cables in the telephone industry that were developed by a
glass company, Corning; the Olestra molecule from Procter & Gamble that started out as a
low-fat ingredient for snack foods and ended up as a pollutant remover on contaminated soil;
a  technology  developed  by  Boeing  as  part  of  a  military  application  that  was  used  for
Touchbridge Systems as part of an integrated networking system in the home environment; a
new technology for expanding the capacity of fiber-optic networks discovered by Polaroid
that became quite valuable to telecommunications companies. Moreover, as Cassiman and
(1) I  wish  to  thank  Bruno  Cassiman  for  his  encouragement,  help  and  suggestions.  I  am  grateful  to  the
e-Business Center PWC&IESE for financial support.Ueda (2002) point out, some projects conceived at big firms’ labs but never developed may
give birth to startups run by their inventors. These facts suggest that projects abandoned by
firms are not necessarily unprofitable projects. In fact, profitability might strongly depend on
the firm that exploits the project. In the patent case, for instance, the skewness on patents’
profitability is well known (Scherer, 1965). Nevertheless, a patent lying on the lower part of
the value distribution in the hands of its current patentholder could be at the opposite extreme
of the distribution if exploited by another firm. 
In this paper, we analyse the characteristics of the patented inventions that remain
unexploited on firms’ shelves. We assume that a firm’s decision whether or not to use an
invention is related to the intrinsic characteristics of that invention. In particular, we are
interested to know whether neglected projects are actually low value inventions or whether
they  in  fact  hide  a  potential  value  that  could  be  exploited  in  other  hands  or  in  another
industry. We focus on patent-protected projects because patents contain information on the
characteristics of the underlying invention. Different elements of the patent have been tested
as proxies for different invention dimensions, including value –social value (Trajtenberg,
1990),  private  value  (among  others,  Harhoff  et  al.,  1999)  and  market  value  (Hall  et  al.,
2000)–,  basicness  (Trajtenberg  et  al.,  1992)  and  scope  (Lerner,  1994).  Some  of  these
validated  patent-based  proxies  have  been  used  to  analyse  firm  decisions  such  as  startup
formation (Shane, 2001). 
The literature has underlined as main determinants of project rejection the lack of
complementary assets to bring an innovation to market (Shane, 2001) and the poor fit of the
project with the firm’s strategy (Teece, 1986). Nevertheless, firms differ in their criteria for
selecting projects. In particular, a firm will tend to reject more projects the more patent-
intensive the firm is (Klepper & Sleeper, 2002), the older it is, or the higher its profits are
(Cassiman & Ueda, 2002). 
Also, there may be other reasons why a firm decides not to undertake a project, apart
from the characteristics of the underlying invention or the characteristics of the firm. This is
specially true in the case of projects protected by patents, where legal protection allows for
strategic  considerations.  For  instance,  a  patent  may  prevent  competitors  from  entering  a
particular technological area. Thus, a firm may use a patent merely for blocking purposes
–either because it wants to reserve to itself the right to enter this area in the near future or
because it wants to prevent competitors from strengthening their position by entering that
area. Patents may also allow a firm to wait until market uncertainty is overcome (Takalo
and Kanniainen, 2000). In these and similar cases, even if projects are not developed and
marketed, we cannot consider them as rejected projects. They serve a definite purpose in the
firm’s project portfolio: their strategic use. 
Moreover, patent-protected projects facilitate arm’s-length technology transactions.
A  project  protected  by  an  intellectual  property  right  makes  the  transfer  less  subject  to
problems of opportunism (Arora and Fosfuri, 2000). This is specially true in industries where
patents are an effective means of protection –chemicals, software, machinery and engineering
services– and as a result, markets for technology arise (Arora et al., 2000). In these industries,
therefore,  patented  projects  may  have  a  quite  straightforward  outside  opportunity,  i.e.
licensing or sale. This means that even if a patented project has no value inside the firm, the
firm may choose to license it to some other company that will be able to extract rents from it.
However, this alternative turns out to be very costly outside these industries, when the deal
links firms in different sectors or, even in the mentioned sectors, for newcomers or small
firms. In many cases, in fact, licensing is impracticable even for patented projects.  
2In this paper we focus on patent-protected projects for a number of reasons. First,
patents are a good proxy for inventive activity by firms (2) and contain a lot of information
about the underlying invention. More importantly, rejected projects mean rejected patents,
also known as “sleeping patents”. A rejected patented project is, in principle, more inefficient
than a rejected project. In both cases, there is an inefficiency if the invention never reaches
consumers. And in both cases there is an inefficiency if the invention is reinvented by a
competitor, owing to the duplication of research efforts (3). However, if the invention is not
patented in the first place, consumers will eventually benefit from the invention, whereas if it
is patented, they will not benefit (or only after a delay), as the patent will prevent competitors
from introducing the innovation (until the patent expires). 
The  literature  has  not  devoted  a  lot  of  attention  to  sleeping  patents,  despite  the
importance  of  the  phenomenon.  As  mentioned  earlier,  a  huge  percentage  of  the  patents
owned by patent-intensive firms are sleeping. For instance, IBM, Philips and Siemens are
reported to use only around 40% of their intellectual property portfolio (4). 
For  our  research  we  use  a  unique  dataset  of  sleeping  patents  collected  from
yet2.com,  the  only  website  active  in  technology  transfer  between  firms.  We  match  this
dataset with the NBER Patent Citations Data File in order to analyse whether sleeping patents
differ significantly from the firm’s “average patent” along different dimensions. This way, we
are able to estimate the magnitude of the inefficiency due to the existence of sleeping patents.
The greater the value potential of the underlying inventions, the more inefficient it would be
to keep them sleeping. Thus, we are able to conclude whether they are worth waking up. Our
results suggest that sleeping patents are more radical innovations and fit better with the firm’s
strategy than the rest. We do not find significant evidence that they are less important patents
than the rest. These results suggest that sleeping patents are not just marginal patents but may
have  some  hidden  potential  for  value  that  could  be  realised  in  other  hands  than  the
patentholders’.
2. Theoretical development
The  following  section  is  split  in  two  parts.  Firstly,  we  propose  a  definition  of
sleeping patents. Secondly, we develop our hypotheses.
2.1. A definition of sleeping patents
Previous literature offers no explicit definition of sleeping patents, even though it
does provide some rationale for their existence (Kutsoati and Zabojnik, 2001) (5). They are
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(2) It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  relationship  between  patents  and  projects  is  not  one-to-one.  A  new
technology may be protected by one patent (in Chemicals, the mean is two or three patents per product) and
up to one hundred patents (in Electronics, for example). In this paper, we will focus on the first type of
patented inventions; therefore, we do not believe that this fact poses a serious problem to our analysis.
(3) Note that if the invention is patented, competitors may either come by chance to the same result or they may
invent around the patent (it is public information). In the latter case, the inefficiency due to duplication of
efforts is smaller than in the not-patented case. In this situation, the total inefficiency brought by the project
rejection will be higher in the patented case as long as the inefficiency due to consumers not profiting from
the innovation plus the inefficiency caused by inventing around it is greater than the inefficiency due to the
duplication of efforts in the non-patented case.
(4) According to Financial Times, July 2001.
(5) They  show  that  a  durable-good  monopolist  may  strategically  shelve  a  patent  (when  its  use  is  socially
desirable) because its potential adoption intensifies the monopolist’s time inconsistency problem.mentioned as patents that have never turned into an industrial application (6). However, this
definition of sleeping patents as patents covering inventions that have been rejected by the
firm, that is, inventions that the firm has not brought to market, is not very precise. First, we
should note that an invention can reach the market through development by the patentholder,
or through development by a licensee or an alliance, joint venture or some other type of
agreement with a third party. A licensed patent, for instance, is not a sleeping patent.
Second, not all the inventions that do not reach the market are actually rejected,
especially when they are patented. The firm may choose to keep some of them for strategic
reasons, given that they are protected by a patent. Some authors have recently emphasised the
increasing strategic role of patents. A patent may be used to prevent entry in an area in which
competitive pressures would be much higher if competitors were allowed in (Gilbert and
Newbery, 1983). A patent may also be used as a “legal bargaining chip” (Hall and Ham,
1999)  when  negotiating  a  cross-licensing  agreement,  an  infringement  suit  or  access  to
external finance. A patent can be used to “build a wall” to effectively protect a really core
invention by the firm (Hopenhayn and Mitchell, 1999). A patent gives the patentholder the
right to wait and see how market uncertainties are resolved before launching the innovation
to  market  (Takalo  and  Kanniainen,  2000).  A  patent  may  allow  a  firm  to  block  entry  to
competitors until it has all the complementary assets needed to bring the invention to market
(Shane, 2001). Therefore, patented inventions may play a key role in a firm’s intellectual
property strategy, even if they are not brought to market. Consequently, we cannot consider
patents that are used for strategic purposes as sleeping patents. 
Third,  patents  and  inventions  are  not  related  one-to-one.  One  invention  may  be
covered by many patents, and one patent may cover different inventions. The latter case is
illustrated  by  basic  inventions  such  as  the  laser  or  Lycra,  which  may  generate  a  lot  of
applications but not all of them are likely to actually be developed. Therefore, we could
consider  applications  that  are  covered  by  the  patent  but  that  are  developed  as  sleeping
applications. From this point of view, given the increasing anecdotal evidence of inventions
originated  in  one  sector  but  applicable  to  others,  many  patents  would  have  sleeping
applications, that is, they would be partially sleeping. If the firm were aware of this fact, it
would be possible to detect sleeping applications with the help of broad-based technologists
(Elton et al., 2002). In many cases, however, the patentholder is not even aware that its
invention  could  be  useful  outside  its  sector.  In  these  cases,  the  firm  will  not  make  any
decision about its patent that would allow us to identify it as partially sleeping. This means
that we will not be able to identify underexploited patents in a firm’s portfolio unless the firm
itself is aware of their status as sleeping patents. Therefore, we should restrict our definition
of partially sleeping patents to patents that the firm actually knows are underexploited. 
To  sum  up,  our  definition  of  (partially)  sleeping  patents  is  this:  patents (or
applications in a patent) that are consciously not being used by the patentholder, directly
or through a third party, either to launch an application to market or for strategic reasons. 
2.2. Determinants of the decision to leave a patent unexploited
In  this  subsection,  I  argue  that  certain  dimensions  of  an  invention,  such  as
importance, broadness, radicalness and strategic fit, may influence the decision not to exploit
a patent. I also consider firm characteristics that may influence this decision.
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(6) One of the three requisites an invention has to satisfy to be eligible for a patent is “to have industrial
applicability”. However, there is no requirement to actually use the patent in an industrial application once
it has been granted. – Private Value or Scientific Importance
Patent value has been captured through a variety of indicators: the social surplus
brought  by  the  protected  invention;  the  private  value  as  perceived  by  the  patent  owner
(renewal or litigation decisions (7)); or the private value as perceived by third parties (stock
market valuation, opposition (8)). The value of the invention, either social or private, has
been linked in the literature to the importance the scientific community gives to the invention
(Trajtenberg,  1990;  Harhoff  et  al.,  1999;  Hall  et  al.,  2000;  among  others).  Private  value
translates into economic value for the patentholder (Harhoff et al., 1999). Therefore, relevant
technological discoveries anticipate greater economic value for the firm. This fact supports
Shane’s (2001) finding about the positive effect that the importance of the invention has on
the likelihood of new firm formation. Similarly, the importance of an invention is likely to
affect the firm’s decision of whether to undertake its development. The higher the invention’s
private value, the more likely it will overcome the firm’s opportunity cost and the more
willing the firm will be to face uncertainties. Conversely, the less important the patent, the
less likely the firm will be to develop the underlying invention. Consequently, we suggest
that the more valuable an invention, the less likely it will be left sleeping, and viceversa. 
– Strategic fit
Established  firms  have  developed  organisational  and  technical  capabilities
associated with their core activities. As a result, they are much more efficient at exploiting
opportunities inside these boundaries than outside them. That is a reason why activities such
as research and development are focused on projects that will allow the firm to exploit its
existing capabilities. However, outcomes from the research phase are, up to a point, random
(9). In the development phase, by contrast, projects may be easily selected to better fit the
complementary  assets  available  in  the  firm,  in  order  to  better  appropriate  their  value.
Therefore, inventions resulting from the research process are likely to be screened according
to  how  they  fit  with  the  firm’s  existing  complementary  assets.  In  research-intensive
industries, a firm’s existing capabilities are likely to be highly specialised in the development
of a very particular type of innovation, namely, the type of innovation that is closest to the
firm’s existing business. Consequently, the firm will filter projects according to how close
they are to its core businesses. 
The  same  argument  holds  for  the  decision  to  maintain  patented  inventions  for
strategic reasons. Patents closest to the firm’s core are the strategically most valuable ones to
keep in order to protect key innovations, keep competitors at bay, or increase the value of the
firm’s patent portfolio. Of course, patents are also strategic in new areas of research, but
the relative importance is lower than in key areas.
Therefore, we suggest that inventions that have a better fit with the firm’s existing
activities are more likely to be developed (by whatever means) by the firm. Conversely, the
further removed research results are from the firm’s core activities, the greater the likelihood
that these results will remain unexploited.
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(7) We refer to litigation decisions where the patent owner is the plaintiff. 
(8) Opposition refers to a procedure in the European Patent System where a competitor may challenge a patent
in the EPO by presenting evidence that the prerequisites for patentability are not fulfilled (see Harhoff and
Rietzig, 2001).
(9) An inventor’s research output could be limited to the core of the firm if she credibly commits not to
implement inefficient projects ex post (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994).– Scope
Scope  refers  to  the  technological  space  the  patent  covers  or  protects  from
infringement. Characteristics of the invention determine scope, but scope is also influenced
by  how  inventors  “design”  the  patent.  Scope  has  been  linked  to  the  economic  value
associated with the patent (Lerner, 1994), since it determines the degree of protection, that is,
the  number  of  potential  products  that  will  infringe  the  patent.  However,  Shane  (2001)
considers scope a different dimension from importance. He shows that broadness is specially
relevant for entrepreneurs, because it gives them more time to obtain complementary assets,
and that is much more critical for new than for established firms. Therefore, scope seems to
be especially valuable for firms when they need extra protection (10). This will be the case,
for instance, if the invention does not fit in any of the firm’s existing business and the firm
must first acquire and develop new complementary assets. It will also be the case when there
is high uncertainty regarding the potential value of the invention, as often happens with the
outcomes of basic research. In these cases, if the invention is covered by a broader rather than
a narrower patent, it is more likely that the patent will be used. To sum up, in any given
situation, a broader patent is more likely to be used than a narrower patent, because patent
protection will be stronger. However, the more the firm needs this stronger protection, the
greater the chances that a broader patent will go to market or be used strategically compared
with a narrower patent. 
Nevertheless, note that the broader the patent, the larger the technological space it
covers and, therefore, the larger the array of potential applications that can be developed
under its protection. This means a higher probability that some of these applications will
actually remain sleeping. 
Therefore,  two  opposite  effects  may  arise  with  respect  to  this  dimension  of  the
invention. The larger the scope, the more likely that the patent will be used and, therefore,
the less likely that it will remain sleeping. However, the larger the scope, the more likely that
some of its applications will actually remain sleeping. 
– Radicalness or Innovativeness
Many  authors  have  argued  that  entrants  are  more  likely  to  introduce  radical
innovations  than  incumbents,  whereas  incumbents  are  more  likely  to  introduce  marginal
improvements  of  current  technologies  (Henderson,  1993,  among  others).  Radical
innovations, as the name suggests, often represent a clean break with the firm’s traditional
line of research. Not only are existing assets and capabilities useless for undertaking these
projects;  introducing  these  innovations  may  actually  destroy  the  firm’s  existing  business
(through cannibalization, for instance). These are the two main reasons why established firms
are  unwilling  to  engage  in  highly  innovative  projects.  Conversely,  entrants  have  no  well
developed skills to be undermined, so they are not reluctant to accept such projects. In fact,
they are willing to undertake the projects that do not fit into established firms because they
will not have to face competition from them. Shane (2001) finds some evidence of this: in
their decision to form a new firm, entrepreneurs are more likely to pick up more innovative
patents rather than less innovative ones. Most of the literature suggests that the allocation
of projects between incumbents and start-ups is due to inefficiencies in the decision process
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(10) Even though any firm will prefer broad to narrow patents, broadness is costly (it means devoting more
resources to enforcement and more possibilities of infringement, and, therefore, of litigation). Moreover,
broadness is not only determined by the firm’s decision.of  the  incumbents.  In  contrast,  Cassiman  &  Ueda  (2002)  suggest  that  it  is  due  to  the
comparative advantage of the start-up to adopt more radical projects. 
Previous literature clearly suggests that the more radical the invention, the less likely
an established firm is to undertake its development. Therefore, in an established firm, the
more innovative the invention, the more likely that it will remain sleeping. 
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
The data we use come from two sources. We use “The NBER Patent Citation Data
File” (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001) to select a sample from the population of patents
assigned from 1981 to 1999 by the USPTO to a set of 101 patent-active firms. These firms
are not selected randomly but are identified as customers at yet2.com, the nowadays unique
website devoted to the transfer of patented technologies between firms (11). Outside the
Internet, there is no proper marketplace for technology transfer (Arora et al., 2000). Instead,
there are very fragmented sectorial markets or consultant firms that search for licensees and
licensors on a case-by-case basis. This fact makes selling or licensing intellectual property
particularly costly. The mentioned web site, yet2.com, was founded with the aim of lowering
the most elementary transaction costs, coordination costs, by creating a virtual marketplace
where supply and demand of intellectual property assets could meet. Transfer of intellectual
property assets also involves high levels of motivation costs (12). That is why this website
created a market for underused technology focused on big and well-known firms. In this way,
potential motivation costs are mitigated thanks to the reputation effects of these firms as
suppliers of technology.
The reason we used this criterion (being a customer at yet2.com) to select the firms
is the following: we can identify, from among all the patents that each of these firms has in its
portfolio, the patents it chooses to offer on an Internet marketplace. We assume that this
decision captures the fact that these are the firm’s sleeping patents. Sleeping patents are idle
resources  for  the  firm.  They  are  patented  projects  the  firm  rejects  because  they  are  not
profitable enough (given the firm’s opportunity cost) to warrant development or licensee
search. Yet2.com has created an Internet marketplace for technology transfer that offers an
alternative for all these projects by reducing the cost of the external option (licensing or
selling). In most cases, however, licensing through the Web is not an alternative to traditional
ways of licensing. Traditionally, licenses are signed, amidst great secrecy, among parties that
transact repeatedly or that have some established reputation in the market for technology. The
reason: the risks of disclosure to a third party (ex-post opportunism problems), which are
minimized through market enforcement mechanisms such as reputation or repeated games. In
an Internet marketplace, deals are offered in an open marketplace which almost everybody
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(11) yet2.com was founded in the year 2000 and had as initial competitors pl-x.com and ipex.com, which did
not  survive.  Nowadays,  only  yet2.com  (acquired  by  Scipher,  December  2002),  in  the  firm  niche,  and
techex.com (acquired by UTEK Corporation, 2002), in the university niche, are devoted to the patented
technology transfer business through the Internet. 
(12) Motivation costs are derived from information asymmetries between the two contracting parties that may
result in opportunistic behaviour. In the licensing case, for instance, the licensor does not know about the
performance of the technology in the licensee’s hands or how he will use the knowledge acquired in
the licensing deal. Similarly, the licensee does not know about the actual quality of the technology and the
degreein the  industry  can  access.  This  may  raise  strategic  concerns  for  the  supplier  regarding
disclosure (the firm reveals information to the rest of the industry players about a given
technology) and unknown potential licensees (who may use the knowledge acquired during
the license period to develop a competing technology). Knowing the suppliers’ concerns,
buyers may have their own concerns regarding the quality of the technology on offer in such
a  marketplace.  Consequently,  an  Internet  marketplace  is  unlikely  to  take  the  place  of
traditional licensing mechanisms. Instead, it will offer an alternative to own development (or
strategic use) and traditional licensing. Thus, patents offered for sale via yet2.com are likely
to be idle patents, that is, patents covering projects that the firm has decided not to develop,
use strategically or license through traditional means.  
We  restrict  our  attention  to  firms  offering  patents  for  sale  or  license  in  the
“Chemicals” or “Biotechnology” categories as defined by the United States Patent Office
(13). In these sectors, patents are an effective means of protecting inventions, and technology
transfer between firms is commonplace (14). Therefore, chemical and biotech patents offered
for sale on the Internet have interesting characteristics. First, they are patents that can actually
enforce the protection of the invention transferred and so make the transfer of technology less
costly (more likely). Second, since technology transfer already takes place in these sectors,
firms have had the chance to license through traditional means before deciding to offer their
patents in an Internet marketplace. Third, because of the effective protection conferred in this
case, strategic use is also a relevant alternative. Therefore, we have patents that firms have
actually chosen not to develop, use strategically or license through traditional channels. 
Having selected the sample of sleeping patents (955 observations), we identified the
patentholders (101 firms). Then, from the NBER database, we identified the portfolios of
patents granted to these firms in the chemicals and biotech categories from 1981 to 1999
(15). Having identified the population of non-sleeping patents, we drew from it a random
sample  of  18876  patents  (16).  From  the  NBER  database,  we  retrieved  individual  patent
information  about  the  sleeping  and  non-sleeping  patents,  including  application  year,  year
granted,  primary  sector,  number  of  citations  made  and  received,  and  other  primary  and
constructed variables. 
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(13) yet2.com classification of technologies into categories is based on the patentholder’s criteria and does not
necessarily correspond with the classification proposed by the NBER authors, based on the primary class
the United States Patent Office (USPTO) assigns the patent. Consequently, we select the patents that fit the
“Chemical” or “Drugs and Medical” categories under both classifications. This selection may introduce
some bias, since we restrict the analysis to patents that fall within these categories according to their
primary class. However, a given patent can have applications in more than one sector, and this is captured
by both its primary and secondary classes. Thus, we are missing the effect of patents whose secondary
classes are mapped into the chemicals and biotech sectors. Nevertheless, including all the patents identified
under  chemicals  or  biotech  in  yet2.com  independently  of  their  USPTO  classification  would  have
introduced more serious biases. 
(14) As Arora (1994) points out: “in the chemical industry (..) the object of discovery can be described clearly
in terms of formulae, reaction pathways, operating conditions and the like”. This fact makes clear the
object of the patent and, thus, strengthens the protection. This strong protection makes licensing specially
feasible and a major strategy of rent appropriation in this sector, as opposed to others. 
(15) Sleeping patents identified are granted up to 2002, but the NBER database from which we extract the
information only covers up to 1999. 
(16) The non-sleeping patent population (from chemicals and biotech) adds up to 64006 patents. Consequently,
non-sleeping patents represent only 1.5% of the whole sleeping-patents population (see Table 1 for the
distribution  of  sleeping  and  non-sleeping  patents  across  patentholders).  We  therefore  draw  a  random
sample  of  the  non-sleeping-patents  population  in  order  to  achieve  5%  sleeping-patents  vs.  95%  non-
sleeping patents. The random sample was obtained by Stata7 by randomly selecting 28% of the whole
portfolio of chemicals and biotech patents of these firms. The only restriction was to maintain the overall
proportion of chemicals and biotech patents found in the sleeping-patent sample (86% vs. 13%).3.2. Analysis
We have used these data to estimate the probability of patent rejection by the firm.
Each observation represents a patent. The outcome variable is a binary dependent variable: it
captures the decision by the firm whether or not to offer a patent in the mentioned Internet
marketplace (we assume that this decision reflects the sleeping or non-sleeping nature of the
patent). We should therefore use a discrete choice model with the following specification for
patent j in firm I:
where if
where Y*ij denotes the unobservable propensity to sleep, X is a vector of patent-
varying exogenous variables and εij is the unobservable error term. Therefore, it is assumed
that  patent  sleeping  incidence  is  observed  only  when  the  patent’s  propensity  to  sleep  is
greater than a threshold equal to zero. Nevertheless, we cannot assume independence on the
error terms since, by construction, there are many patents in the sample owned by a given
firm i. Thus, each firm represents a cluster of correlated observations. In order to capture
unobserved firm-specific effects, we should introduce an extra variable to the model, αi.   
Υ∗
ij = αi+ β'Xij + εij j = 1,2,…Ni  ;    i  = 1,2,…I
where  αi captures  the  firm-specific  unobserved  characteristics.  The  dilemma  is
whether αi should be treated just as a constant term over firms (fixed effects model) or as a
random variable just like the error term (random effects model). The latter approach obtains
more efficient estimates but it requires the assumption that the αi’s are independent of the
X’s, that is, the firm effects term should be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (if our
estimates are to be consistent). The Hausman test allows to test this assumption (Maddala,
1993). The results of the Hausman test differ with the specification of the model. Thus, we do
not find conclusive evidence either for rejection or for acceptance of the null hypothesis of
consistency of the random effects model. Nevertheless, we are interested in including some
firm-invariant variables such as the size of a firm’s patent portfolio. In this case, if we use the
fixed effects model we cannot estimate the parameters λ, because αi captures the effect of all
the time-invariant variables. Therefore, since we do not find conclusive evidence for the
rejection of the random effects model and we want to estimate the parameters λ, we treat αi
as random. The specification is as follows:
The probit regression is the most appropriate discrete choice technique to estimate it
(Maddala, 1993). Therefore, we use a probit random effects model.
3.3. Variables
3.3.1. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable reflects the sleeping or non-sleeping character of the patent.
Patents are coded 1 if identified as being offered in yet2.com and thus considered sleeping
patents, and 0 otherwise. There are 18876 observations coded as 0 and almost one thousand
patents  (955  observations)  coded  as  1,  which  represents  five  percent  of  the  total.  These
patents correspond to a set of 101 different firms. Nevertheless, we shall drop observations
from firms that have less than 1% of observations coded as 1. This results in a set of 86 firms
with  10956  observations  coded  as  0  and  907  observations  coded  as  1,  which  represents
7.65% of the total.
9
YX ij ij ij






















ij i ij i ij z X Y ε γ β α + ′ + ′ + =
*3.3.2. Predictor Variables
– Importance
Previous  literature  has  suggested  as  a  proxy  for  “patent  value”  the  number of
citations a patent receives from subsequent patents. When inventors patent an invention, they
must cite the previous inventions their innovation builds upon. Patents that receive more
citations are thus considered to be making a bigger contribution to the scientific community
than  patents  with  fewer  citations.  Therefore,  citations  received  from  subsequent  patents
reflect a given patent’s contribution to further research (see Jaffe et al., 2000 for evidence
from a survey). The validity of this proxy has been tested by analyzing its correlation with
other measures of value. Trajtenberg (1990) found that the more socially valuable patents
were more frequently cited. Hall et al. (2000) concluded that companies with more frequently
cited patents have higher stockmarket values. Harhoff et al. (1999) found that German patents
renewed to full term (17) are more highly cited and that, among the full-term patents, the
most  valuable  ones  –according  to  the  patentholder’s  assessment–  were  also  the  most
frequently cited. 
Citations present the following practical problem: because the data are truncated at a
certain point in time, patents granted closer to this truncation date have a shorter time span to
receive citations. As the NBER data reveal, a patent will have received only 50% of its
citations in ten years from its granted year (Hall et al., 2001), although citation lags seem to
have been shortening in recent years. These authors propose two methods to empirically deal
with this situation: i) standardization, which removes variance due to truncation and also
some variance due to real effects; and ii) econometric models, which allow us to identify
these two sources of variance but require some assumptions about the process that may drive
differences in citations across groups. We use the first method, standardization, because we
are working with only two groups of patents (chemicals and biotech) which we do not expect
to have very divergent citation patterns (we will subtract the same real variance, if any, in
both cases). Alternatively, we simply introduce year dummies (18). 
– Strategic fit
We  measure  strategic  fit  through  self-citations received.  Self-citations  refer  to
citations received from patents owned by the same firm. Therefore, as citations received
proxy the importance of a patent for the scientific community, self-citations received may
proxy the importance of a patent for the firm. The more important a patent is for the firm, the
more likely it is to be linked to the firm’s core technologies. As we will mention, the further
away a technology is from the firm’s current assets and capabilities, the less incentive the
firm  will  have  to  invest  in  that  technology.  Therefore,  the  more  self-citations  a  patent
receives, the more likely it will be to fit with the firm’s strategic core. 
We also consider the number of inventors as a proxy for strategic fit. Reitzig (2001)
considers that a large number of inventors points to patent complexity. We believe that the
number of inventors is an indicator of the resources the firm devotes to a particular research
10
(17) Patents  have  a  20-year  validity  span.  However,  the  patentholder  must  pay  renewal  fees  (annual  and
progressive in the German case) in order to maintain the patent right valid. Otherwise, the patent right
lapses.
(18) As Shane(2001) does. See Henderson et al. (1998) and Lerner (2001) as empirical analyses using the
standardization method.line. Since an established firm has incentives to devote more resources to the projects that are
closest to the firm’s already existing assets, the more resources the firm devotes to a project,
the better it will fit with the firm’s strategy. 
Following the same reasoning, we suggest another potential indicator related to the
strategic fit of the patent in the firm’s portfolio: the frequency in the firm’s patent portfolio of
the patent class to which a given patent is assigned. We assume that the more frequent the
patent class is in a firm’s patent portfolio, the more likely it is to represent a core research
line in the firm. 
– Scope
There have been different attempts to measure scope, i.e. the technological space a
patent covers. The most widely used indicator (Lerner, 1994; Shane, 2001; Reitzig, 2001) is
the number of patent classes a patent is assigned to, which reflects the number of potential
sectors of activity in which the patent may be applicable. Instead, we use the number of
patent classes the citations received by a patent are assigned to, as suggested by Trajtenberg
et al. (1992). We consider that the spread across patent classes of citations received gives an
idea of the technological space the patent covers (in which fields a given patent is considered
as prior art). In the NBER paper, a Herfindhal-type concentration index for citations received
(generality) is proposed:
= percentage of citations received by patent  j that belong to patent class k out of nj patent classes
A higher generality means a lower concentration of citations across patent classes
and therefore, a higher spread of the patent impact. Therefore, the higher the generality, the
higher the scope. As NBER authors point out, a general technology can be understood as a
“general purpose technology”.
We adjust this measure by the number of citations, since they introduce a bias (as
suggested by Hall et al., 2001). Moreover, this adjustment allows to correct for correlation.
We call the adjusted variable adjusted generality.
C = number of citations received
We also use the number of claims, as proposed by Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999).
Claims are the number of sentences that describe an invention; they can be interpreted as
“units of invention” (Jaffe, Hall & Trajtenberg, 1999). The higher the number of such “units”,
the broader the technological space the patent covers. We can think that this measure as
highly endogenous (Reitzig 2001), because the firm may decide to break down the “actual”
blocks of invention into the smallest possible pieces. However, the firm’s discretion in the
way it describes the innovation is highly constrained by the type of technology and the patent
officer examination.
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We measure the degree of innovativeness with a set of variables. First, we consider
the  number  of  citations the  patent  made to  previous  patents.  The  lower  the  number  of
citations made, the less derivative in nature the patent is, i.e. the less it builds upon previous
research (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 1999) and the more innovative it can be considered.
Second, we consider originality (adjusted originality), a Herfindhal-like index that
measures the concentration of the citations a patents makes across patent classes. The wider
the spread of citations made, the more original the invention. A high spread of citations made
means that the invention is “breaking molds” (Hall et al., 2001) rather than being a mere
sequential invention. Therefore, the more radical the innovation will be.
We also consider as a proxy for innovativeness the mean time lag between the grant
year of the patent and the grant year of the subsequent patents that refer to it (forward lag).
The  later  the  citations  come,  the  later  others  realised  about  the  potential  of  this  area  of
research, meaning that the firm was initially working on it alone (19). We also introduce the
analogous measure to forward lag but referring to citations made (backward lag). The older
the patents the invention relies on, the less innovative it is considered. 
Finally,  another  potential  proxy  for  radicalness  more  related  to  the  degree  of
innovativeness inside the firm is self-citations made, i.e. the percentage of citations made to
previous patents assigned to the same firm over all the citations made. The lower the ratio of
self-citations made, the more recent this research line is to the firm.
We propose more than one proxy for some of the patent dimensions that we want to
analyze. Nevertheless, none of them aims to be “the” proxy for a given patent characteristic.
Rather, they try to capture different dimensions of it. Looking at their correlation (Table 2),
we can see that they are actually quite independent measures and that we will not suffer from
multicollinearity problems if we use them in the same regression.
3.3.3. Control variables
– Firm characteristics
We  control  for  the  following  firm  characteristics:  patent  portfolio,  size  and
diversification (20). These characteristics may affect the firm’s decision whether to shelve or
to use a patent, as well as the characteristics of the patented invention. All these measures are
from 1996, the last year for which we have patent data. 
The size measure is firm sales, obtained from Compustat. It may have a direct as
well an indirect effect on the likelihood of keeping sleeping patents. On the one hand, size is
a proxy for bargaining power. The larger the firm, the better positioned it is considered to be
in potential licensing deals. This may affect its willingness to engage in such deals. This may
mean either that the firm actually engages in more deals and, therefore, has fewer sleeping
patents; or that it is more willing to wake up its patents once there is a less costly means of
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(19) Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999) suggest the interpretation for early citations 
(20) The latter two measures are available only for a certain set of firms (public US-based firms with more than
$10 million in assets and 500 shareholders).marketing them (such as a Web-based marketplace). On the other hand, we may expect size
to  affect  the  way  the  firm  perceives  different  invention  characteristics  when  considering
whether to adopt or reject a project. We have mentioned, for instance, that bigger firms are
more reluctant to adopt more innovative projects. 
The portfolio measure is a count measure on the number of patents granted to a
given firm from 1980 to 1996. The patent portfolio is a more accurate proxy for the firm’s
bargaining power than firm size. If the firm has a larger amount of patents, it will actually
have a stronger position in a negotiation. Moreover, a firm with a larger patent portfolio will
be more used to managing and exploiting its intellectual property through licensing or sale (it
will  probably  have  a  technology  transfer  department,  for  instance).  Therefore,  the  more
patent-intensive the firm, the fewer sleeping patents it is likely to have. However, for the
same reason, it will not be reluctant to wake up its patents in a Web-based marketplace.
To  compute  the  diversification measure,  we  use  data  on  the  firm’s  sales  at  the
business  segment  level,  available  in  Form  10-K  filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission (SEC), to compute a diversification measure (as proposed in Davis et al., 1994).
The diversification measure takes the form:
Diversification  = ,
pi = proportion of the firm’s sales made in segment i (21) 
We  hypothesize  that  the  more  diversified  the  firm,  the  less  likely  it  will  have
sleeping patents. In a diversified firm, there are more chances that a given invention will be
exploited in some of the firm’s activities or that it will be licensed or sold to external partners,
thanks to a larger and more diversified network.
– Time
This control is required because all citations or citations-related variables are time-
dependent. We control for the year in which the patent is applied for (from 1981 to 1999). 
– Technology classes
The  majority  of  the  independent  variables  vary  with  the  technology  field  of  the
patent, from claims to all citations-related measures. Thus, to compare patents from different
fields, we should control for technology categories, which are built upon patent classes (Hall
et al., 2001). These authors distinguish up to 6 technology categories, but here we shall focus
only on two, Chemicals and Drugs & medical.
Table 1 presents a summary of the variables.
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(21) Segments identified according to the 4-digit level Standard Industrial Codes –SICs-Table 1. Summary of variables
Variable name Description Proxy Expected sign on the 
sleeping likelihood
Citations received  Number of citations the 
patent receives from 
subsequent patents Importance  –
Self-citations received  Share of citations received 
from patents by  the same 
firm Strategic fit –
Inventors Number of inventors  Strategic fit –
Frequency class Frequency of the primary 
class the patent is assigned
in the firm’s patent 
portfolio Strategic fit –
Claims  Number of sentences 
describing the invention Scope +/–
Generality Herfindahl index on the 
spread of citations received
from different patent classes  Scope +/–
Citations made Number of citations the 
patent makes to previous 
patents Innovativeness –
Originality Herfindahl index on the 
spread of citations made 
to different patent classes  Innovativeness –
Forward lag Mean lag between the 
application year of the patent 
and that of the citing patents  Innovativeness +
Backward lag Mean lag between the 
application year of the patent 
and that of the cited patents  Innovativeness –
Self-citations made Share of citations made to 
patents by  the same firm Innovativeness +
Application  Year in which the firm submits
year dummy the patent to the Patent Office  Time control n.a.
Category dummy Technological category that 
corresponds to the patent 
primary class  Technological control n.a.
Portfolio Number of patents granted 
to the firm (in any technological 
category, 1980-1996) Firm invariant variable  +/–
Diversification  Diversification measure Firm invariant variable –
Sales Firm sales (in billions) Firm invariant variable +/–
144. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
We report in Table 2 the descriptive statistics for the set of patent data that we will
mainly  use  in  the  regression  analysis.  It  corresponds  to  a  set  of  86  firms  and  11863
observations (22). We can appreciate significant differences in means for the two subsamples:
sleeping (Y = 1) vs. non-sleeping (Y = 0) patents. Variables with a significant and negative
difference are claims, adjusted generality, citations made, inventors, frequency, sales and
diversification. Variables with a positively significant difference include citations received,
forward lag, self-citations made and patent portfolio.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (non-truncated sample)
Variables Mean Min Max Mean Mean Difference1
Y=0 Y=1 (t-test)
Citations received 4.70 0 273 4.738 4.216 .5216*
(1.807)
Standardized citations
received 1.095 0 63.64 .9443 .9535 –.0092
(–.1598)
Self-citations received .255 0 1 .2554 .2504 .005
(.3329)
Inventors 2.676 1 16 2.647 3.028 –.3806***
(–6.678)
Patent class frequency .0579 0 1 .0561 .0807 –.0246***
(–7.716)
Claims 13.81 1 136 13.68 15.44 –1.759***
(–4.357)
Generality .3553 0 .9231 .3545 .3672 –.0128
(–.9822)
Adjusted generality .5846 0 1 .5823 .6167 –.0343**
(–2.006)
Citations made 8.91 0 213 8.86 9.48 –.6196*
(–.1679)
Originality .4175 0 .9267 .4166 .4286 –.01206
(–1.202)
Adjusted originality .5485 0 1 .5478 .5569 –.0091
(–.7581)
Forward lag 4.846 0 17 4.895 4.165 .7301***
(6.236)
Backward lag 11.57 0 76.33 11.55 11.74 –.1902
(–.749)
Self-citations made .2317 0 1 .2357 .1841 .0516***
(2.86)
Portfolio 3688 1 8049 3753 2910 843***
(10.03)
Sales (in millions) 19519 141 4381 19289 23866 –4577***
(–5.617)
Diversification .838 0 1.504 .8266 1.052 –.226***
(–10.08)
1 Mean comparison test on equality of means. Significance level: .01(***), .05(**), .10(*).
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(22) Although we will report some results for the set of 101 firms, we mainly drop from the analysis the 15
firms with less than 1% of sleeping patents, since they may distort results. In Table 3 we present the correlation between the variables used as regressors. Many
of  them  present  a  correlation  significant  at  a  one  percent  level.  However,  the  highest
correlation coefficients are ρ = .389 (between general and citations received) and ρ =.366
(between original and citations made) (23). The next highest correlation is ρ = .259 (between
general and backward lag and portfolio and inventors). These levels of correlation do not
suggest  the  presence  of  multicollinearity  problems,  as  confirmed  by  the  high  tolerances.
When we include diversification and sales, the highest correlation level is ρ = .727 (24).
However, no multicollinearity problems are detected when computing their level of tolerance
(.44 and .37 respectively). 
Table 3. Correlations ( non-truncated sample)
claims cmade crec general original fwd bck selfcm selfctr inv freq portf diversif sales  
cmade . 210 --
creceive .166 .062 -- 
general .077 .021 .389 --
original  .099 .366 .055 .194 -- 
fwd lag –.031 –.120 .239 .259 –.030 --
bck lag  –.023 .119 –.097 –.061 .067  .043  --
selfctm .018* –.021 –.004* –.051 –.088 –.045 –.193 --
selfctr .062  .104 .020* –.057 –.022 –.212 –.002* .137 --
inventors .004*–.004* –.056 –.060 –.025 –.148 –.028 –.052 .025 --
frequency .003*  .021 .033 –.102 –.131 –.084 –.082 .062 .096 .067 --
portfolio .013* .074  .027 .025 .101 .012  .000 .153 .094 –.259 –.300 --
diversif –.020* .070 .006* –.085  –.097 –.092 –.021 .021 .060 .016 .051 –.018* --
sales –.052 .023 .014* –.055 –.064 –.068 –.024 .053 .055 –.068 .014* .298 .72 --  
* NOT statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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(23) When we use the adjusted measures for generality and originality, these correlation coefficients drop to
ρ =.035 and ρ =.136, respectively.
(24) Despite their high correlation, we include both of them as regressors. Otherwise, all the effect is captured
by one of them and the interpretation of results may be misleading.4.2. Empirical Results
We log transform the independent variables in order to reduce their skewness (25).
We present random effects probit models on a patent’s sleeping likelihood (26). In Table 4,
we present results in the form of marginal effects at the median (27) for the set of 86 firms. 
Table 4. Probit Random Effects, Marginal effects at the Median
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Importance
Citations received .0016 –.0013 –.0003 9.07e-06
(.0045) (.0082) (.0133) (.0134)    
Strategic fit
Self citations –.0038 .0441 .0398
received (.0213) (.0425) (.0429)
Inventors .0235*** .0355*** –.0411 .0564*** –.0229
(.007) (.0113) (.0194) (.0511) (.0239)
Frequency .0068 .0202**(***) .0212**
(.0045) (.0085) (.0086)
Scope
Claims .0086* .014** .0225*(**) .0223*(**)  .0090
(.005) (.014) (.0122) (.0123) (.0057)
Generality .0184 .0641(*) .0674(*)  
(.0294) (.0418) (.0423)
Innovativeness
Cmade –.0006 –.0188** –.0277*(**) –.0693**(***) –.0298**(***)
(.0049) (.0096) (.0089) (.0291) (.0123)
Originality .0713** .0721* .0708(*) .0357*
(.032) (.0438) (.0439) (.0201)    
Forward .0149 .07582*(**) .0748*(**)
(.396) (.0438) (.0438)
Backward .0172* .0202 .0210 .014
(.0102) (.0183) (.0185) (.0088)    
Self citations made –.0406 –.0838* –.0834(*) –.0682***
(.2756) (.05225) (.05254) (.0251)
Interactions
Inventors x Cmade .0451*(**) .0245**
(.0237) (.0107)
Firm invariant
Portfolio –.0262*** –.0285*** –.0408*** –.0429*** –.0253***
(.0049) (.0077) (.0125) (.0129) (.0052)
Controls
Technological
category Included*** Included** Included* Included* Included**
Application year Included Included Included Included Included
Constant Included Included Included Included Included
Rho .2801*** .3051*** .3210*** .3253*** .3052***
(.0218) (.0268) (.0326) (.0321)  (.022)
N 11066 7879 5871 5871 9727
Groups 84 83 82 82 84
Wald χ2 – test 40.33*** 189.18*** 160.19*** 163.45*** 199.65***
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Confidence  level  of  the  marginal  effect  at  1%***,  5%**,  10%*.  In  parentheses,  the
confidence level of the coefficients if it differs from the confidence level of the marginal effect.
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(25) In order not to lose observations with a zero value when taking logarithms, we add one to the original
variable before doing the transformation. 
(26) We also performed fixed effects models. Results are basically the same, except for the non-inclusion of the
firm invariant variables and the non-significance of the claims variable. This fact may suggest that the
decision on the number of claims used to describe an invention in a patent is strongly firm-dependent.
Results do change when we use robust probit models (without controlling for firm effects).  
(27) Note that the marginal effect is computed at the median of the log transformed variable. However, given
that we compute it at the median, we can easily find the original value it corresponds to (i.e. the median of
the original variable).Model 1 includes  one  proxy  for  each  of  the  four  magnitudes  of  the  patented
invention  we  are  interested  in:  scope,  importance,  innovativeness  and  strategic  fit.  In
particular, we introduce the raw variables that are known from a granted patent: the number
of  claims describing  the  invention,  the  citations  received,  the  citations made and  the
number of  inventors.  Overall,  the  model  is  significant.  The  proportion  of  the  total  error
variance accounted for by the random effects is significant (rho=.28, p<.000). Claims and
inventors display  significant  positive  coefficients  on  the  patent  sleeping  likelihood.  The
magnitude of the effect of claims is reflected by the .85% increase in the sleeping likelihood
when it increases by 1% from its median (Md = 11), with the rest of the variables constant at
their  median.  The  sign  of  this  variable  suggests  that  the  effect  of  scope  on  the  sleeping
likelihood is actually positive. Similarly, the sleeping likelihood increases by 2.35% when the
number of inventors increases by 1% from its median (Md = 2). Contrary to the prediction,
this result suggests that the more inventors have been involved in a project and, therefore, the
more strategic the patent, the more likely that the patent will end up sleeping. This striking
result may be due to high research intensity in the firm’s core areas, which is likely to result
in  a  high  likelihood  of  project  rejection,  even  if  the  project  actually  fits  with  the  firm’s
strategy. The proxy for importance, citations received, has a different sign from predicted, but
is  non-significant.  Citations made displays  the  predicted  negative  sign  as  a  proxy  for
innovativeness, but its coefficient is not statistically significant. Citations received displays
an  unpredicted  negative  sign,  but  its  magnitude  is  almost  nil  (28).  The  firm-invariant
portfolio variable has a negative coefficient significant at a 1% significance level, suggesting
that the larger the firm’s portfolio and, therefore, the greater its bargaining power in licensing
deals, the less likely it is to have sleeping patents. In particular, there is a 2.6% decrease in
the sleeping likelihood when the patent portfolio increases 1% from its median (Md=3490).
Model 2 adds  all  the  constructed  variables,  i.e.  those  built  on  some  of  the  raw
variables.  In  particular,  we  include  the  (unadjusted)  originality and  generality measures,
the percentage of self-citations and the citation lags, all of them derived from citations. The
overall model is significant, as also is the proportion of the variance of the error accounted
for by the random effect (rho=.305, p<.000), which increases with respect to the previous
model (29). Three dimensions of the innovation appear to have a significant effect on the
sleeping  likelihood.  First,  the  strategic  fit  of  the  invention  shows  up  as  a  significant
dimension, as reflected by the positive and significant coefficient on inventors. In fact, the
increase in the sleeping likelihood is higher than in the previous model (an increase of 3.55%
if it increases 1% from the median). Patent class frequency also displays a positive sign, but
is only significant at a 13% level. Self-citations received is not significant but displays the
predicted positive sign. The evidence, therefore, is inconclusive. However, it suggests that,
contrary  to  predictions,  the  strategic  fit  dimension  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  sleeping
likelihood. Second, patent scope appears also as having a positively significant effect on the
patent sleeping likelihood. Both claims and generality display a positive sign, even though
only the former is significant (a 1.4% increase in the sleeping likelihood if claims increases
by 1% from the median, Md=12). Therefore, the larger the space a patent covers, the greater
the likelihood that the patent (or some of its applications) is (are) actually sleeping, instead of
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(28) An alternative specification with standardized citations received displays basically the same results. 
(29) We have to be careful when comparing results from this model with results from previous or subsequent
models, since the analysis in this case is performed with a reduced set of patents, namely, the patents that
have at least one citation made and one citation received. The reason lies in the fact that when we introduce
citations  derived  variables  in  the  analysis,  some  of  them  take  missing  values  when  citations  made  or
received are equal to zero. These observations are then not included in the regression, having as a result a
sample truncated at citations made and citations received equal to zero –note that citations are independent
variables-.a higher likelihood of being used. Third, the more innovative the invention, the higher the
sleeping  likelihood,  as  predicted.  All  the  variables  that  proxy  for  this  dimension  have
the predicted sign except backward lag, which is significantly negative at a 10% level. The
negative  effect  of  citations made becomes  significant  (30)  (a  1%  increase  from  Md=6
decreases the sleeping likelihood by 1.89%). Originality is the other significant variable;
when it increases by 1% from its median value (Md=.5), it increases the sleeping likelihood
by 7.13%. Therefore, the more radical the patented innovation is considered, the more likely
it is to remain on the firm’s shelves. Citations received, as a proxy for importance, has a non-
significant negative coefficient, but the effect is very close to zero. This result suggests that
sleeping patents are not significantly less important than non-sleeping patents. On the other
hand, the effect on the sleeping likelihood of the portfolio variable remains negative and
significant.
In  Model 3 we  replicate  Model  2  with  the originality  and  generality  measures
adjusted by the number of citations made and received, respectively. As mentioned in section
3.3.2., these adjustments correct for a downward bias in the measures as originally computed.
However, they introduce another kind of bias in the regression: the sample is truncated at
citations made or received equal to one (31). Results do change somewhat from the previous
model. In this model, we find more conclusive evidence of the positive effect of the strategic
fit  dimension  on  the  sleeping  likelihood.  The  effect  of  inventors remains  positive  and
significant, but it is stronger (a 1% increase in the number of inventors from its median
increases the sleeping likelihood by 5.6%). The effect of frequency becomes significant and
is non-negligible (a 2% increase in the sleeping likelihood for a 1% increase from its median,
Md=.28). Self-citations received becomes positive, as predicted, but remains non-significant.
Second, with respect to the scope dimension, claims is still positive and significant, but its
effect is stronger, too (a 2.25% increase in the sleeping likelihood). The positive effect of
generality on the sleeping likelihood becomes significant at a 10% significance level (even
though the marginal effect is not significant in itself) and its effect is quite strong (a 6.4%
increase  in  the  sleeping  likelihood  when  adjusted originality increases  by  1%  from  its
median,  Md=.67).  Third,  along  the  innovativeness  dimension,  some  changes  are  worth
mentioning. Citations made (32) and originality remain significant and the effect of their
coefficient is similar in dimension. Backward lag is no longer significant but maintains its
contrary-to-predicted sign. Instead, the positive effect of forward lag becomes significant and
quite strong (a 7.6% increase in the sleeping likelihood for a 1% increase from its Md=4.8).
Self-citations made also becomes significant, with the strongest marginal effect of all the
variables  (8.4%  decrease,  Md=.11).  The  evidence  of  the  positive  effect  on  the  sleeping
likelihood of the innovative dimension is quite conclusive. However, many of these changes
in the significance of the variables seems to be  due to the sample truncation and not to the
inclusion of the adjusted variables on originality and generality (33). 
Model 4 introduces the effect of interactions. In particular, we test the effect of the
interaction  between  inventors  and citations made (34),  that  is,  between  strategic  fit  and
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(30) Citations made becomes significant when we include the originality variable.
(31) This is due to the adjustment made to these variables, which consists on multiplying the original variables
by (citations/(citations-1)). Therefore, these adjusted measures take missing values when citations are equal
to one.  Consequently, the sample considered for the analysis with adjusted measures is truncated at one. 
(32) In this case, citations made becomes significant only when we control for originality, self-citations made
and backward lag. 
(33) When we run Model 2 with the sample used in Model 3, i.e. a truncated sample at citations equal to one,
we find the coefficients on frequency, forward lag (but not backward) and self-citations made significant,
as we find with Model 3. The magnitude of the coefficients is more similar to the one in Model 3.
(34) The rest of interactions display no significant effect when using the sample truncated at citations equal to
one. innovativeness.  The  inclusion  of  this  interaction  makes  the  inventors variable  no  longer
significant. Citations made remains negative and significant. The interaction between the two
displays a positive and significant coefficient. This means that a more innovative patent is
more likely to remain shelved the lower its fit with the firm’s strategy. In contrast, a patent
with a higher fit is more likely to be left sleeping the less innovative it is (35). These results
suggest  some  very  interesting  conclusions  about  the  rejection  of  projects  by  established
firms. Specifically, firms are more likely to reject more innovative projects in strategically
remote areas and to reject less innovative projects in strategically closer areas. The rest of the
results remain basically the same. 
Model 5 predicts the likelihood of a sleeping patent taking into account only the
information known at application date, that is, all the variables to do with the number of
citations made as well as the number of inventors (36). Results differ slightly from previous
specifications. The main difference is that claims, the proxy for scope, is positive but only
significant at a 10.7% confidence level. Citations made, originality and self-citations made,
which account for radicalness, remain significant and suggest the positive effect that this
dimension has on the sleeping likelihood. The interaction of citations made and inventors
remains positive and significant. The firm’s portfolio also remains positive and significant
and with a similar magnitude than in previous models. These results suggest that with only
the information available at grant date we are able to detect which invention dimensions
affect the sleeping likelihood, except for scope. 
4.2.1. Some more results
In this section, we include two other firm-invariant characteristics that we believe
may capture some of the firm effects considered unobserved in previous models and captured
by the rho. In particular, we are interested in testing whether measures such as diversification
or size change the results. However, these data are available for only a very reduced set of
patentholders, namely 22 firms (37). Results are reported in Table 5. Results are very similar
and divergences are due mainly to the restriction in the sample. 
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(35) Note that the effect of inventors is given by the sum of the coefficients on inventors and on the interaction.
Even  though  the  first  coefficient  is  negative,  the  overall  effect  is  positive,  because  the  effect  of  the
interaction is always positive –the sample is restricted to patents with more than one citation- and greater
than the negative coefficient on inventors.
(36) The specification reported as Model 5 includes the originality measure adjusted. Results do not change
significantly in the alternative specification including the non-adjusted measure.
(37) Four of these 22 firms have a proportion of observations coded with Y=1 lower than 1% and are eliminated
from the analysis. However, results basically do not change when included.Table 5. Probit Random Effects, Marginal effects at the Median. Sample big US firms
Variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Importance
Citations   received –.0032  –.009 –.0100 –.0096 
(.0058) (.0066) (.0128) (.0126)   
Strategic fit
Self citations received –.0428    –.0017    –.0058
(.0327) (.0402) (.0395)
Inventors .0357*** .0465*** .0423**(***) –.0331 .0322***
(.0107) (.0166) (.0204) (.0494) (.0095)
Frequency .0185** .0264**(***) 267**(***)      
(.0081) (.0115) (.0116)
Scope
Claims .0077  .0145  .016 .0157 .0077 
(.0069) (.0103) (.0126) (.0125) (.0065)
Generality .0082     .0208   .0217
(.043) (.0396) (.0389)    
Innovativeness
Cmade –.0065  –.0334** –.0369**(***) –.0628**(***)  –.0162**
(.0067) (.0146) (.0187) (.0299)  (.0079)
Originality .0795*(**) .0809 (*) .0799(*)  .0176
(.0463) (.0433) (.0502)     (.0232)
Forward .0369      .0622 (*) .0604(*) 
(.0293) (.0466) (.0458)    
Backward .0219 .0272  .0270 .019*
(.0157) (.0202) (.0198)     (.0102)
Self citations   made –.068*  –.0545   –.0058  –.0557***
(.0402) (.0402) (.0395)    (.0256)
Interactions
Inventors x Citations made .0324(*)      
(.0222)
Firm invariant
Portfolio –.052** –.0398*** –.0594***  –.0832*** –.0815***  –.0427*** 
(.00899) (.0106) (.0176) (.0293) (.0290) (.0097)
Diversification .1494***   .1162***  .1978   .2730*** .2708*** .1333***
(.0201) (.026) (.0507) (.0891) (.0899)          (.0241)
Sales –.001* –.0016** –0021***  –.0010 –.0011 –.0008
(.0006) (.0000) (.001)  (.0000) (.0011)    (.0006)
Controls
Technological category Included* Included * Included** Included* Included* Included*
Application year Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant Included** Included Included Included** Included* Included
Rho .1947*** .1176** * .1729*** .2652*** .2677***  .1685*** 
(.0279) (.0184) (.0304) (.0495) (.0497) (.0244)
N 6493 6053 4569 4620 3568 5534
Groups 18 18 18 18 18 18
Wald _2 – test 241.9 *** 146.6*** 174.8*** 133.07 *** 189.34*** 188.07***
Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence level of the marginal effect at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. In parentheses,
the confidence level of the coefficients if it differs from the confidence level of the marginal effect.
Model 0 includes only this new set of firm-invariant characteristics. Overall, the
model is significant. We can observe that rho drops to quite low levels (rho=.114), but it is
still  significant.  The  variables  capturing  firm  characteristics  all  display  significant
coefficients.  The  effect  of  portfolio remains  negative,  suggesting  that,  all  the  other  firm
characteristics equal, a firm with more patents in its portfolio is less likely to shelve patents.
The reported marginal effect shows that the probability of a sleeping patent decreases by
.043% when the firm’s portfolio increases by 1% above the median (Md=5192 patents). The
effect of sales on the sleeping likelihood is positive. This finding may support the idea that
bigger  firms  are  not  proactive  in  intellectual  property  management,  whether  because  of
organizational inertia, because of expected negative profitability, or for other reasons. The
21significant positive effect of the diversification coefficient on the sleeping likelihood is even
more  striking.  A  priori,  more  diversified  firms  appear  to  be  more  likely  to  market  their
underused intellectual property than less diversified ones. However, this positive effect may
derive from a bias in the data source. This potential bias may arise because more diversified
firms are better able to perceive that their patents could be useful in other sectors. Therefore,
they are able to “identify” more sleeping patents than less diversified firms. Also, they may
perceive less risk than less diversified firms in posting their sleeping intellectual property in
an open marketplace. Therefore, we could not assess whether more diversified firms are
actually more likely to shelve patents, or have a higher propensity to detect sleeping patents
or to use (Web-based) intellectual property markets than less diversified ones.
Diversification remains  positive  and  significant  across  all  the  models.  Sales  turns
negative and non-significant when we introduce the variables containing patent information.
With respect to the patent characteristics, there are no major changes except for claims, which
remains positive but is no longer significant in any of  the models. We must bear in mind that
these results are quite dependent on this very restricted sample (38). We conclude, therefore,
that the inclusion of diversification and sales captures a great deal of the otherwise unexplained
firm  effects  but  it  does  not  affect  significantly  the  results  for  the  rest  of  variables,  except
(potentially) for the scope dimension. Note that the interaction between inventors and citations
made is significant at only a 10.5% confidence level and is not significant at all in Model 5 (39). 
To sum up, we cannot say whether differences in results with respect to the whole
set of firms are due to the restricted set of firms or to the inclusion of two firm-invariant
variables.  However,  unreported  regression  results  suggest  that  the  inclusion  of  these  two
control variables lowers the unobserved firm-specific effects captured by rho but does not
affect results on the patent-derived variables. If this were the case, we could interpret the
results from Table 4 without restrictions.  
4. Conclusions
This paper analyses a firm’s decision to exploit (itself or through a third party) or not
to exploit a patent-protected invention. This decision is captured through another decision
made  by  the  firm  that  we  can  observe,  namely,  the  decision  whether  or  not  to  offer  its
intellectual property for license or sale in a Web-based marketplace. We believe that this is a
marginal alternative for exploiting intellectual property, especially for big firms, which have
access  to  more  resources  either  to  exploit  by  themselves  or  to  license  their  intellectual
property.  Therefore,  all  the  patents  for  which  the  firm  chooses  this  alternative  can  be
considered sleeping patents (40). 
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(38) It is not clear whether this change in significance is due to the introduction of sales and diversification or to
the  sample  restriction.  Note  that  if  we  run  the  models  for  this  restricted  sample  without  including
diversification and sales, results are quite similar than when we include then. Only Model2 and Model3
present a significant coefficient on claims at a 10% confidence level when we do not include these two
firm invariant characteristics. Therefore, claims is not robust in the set of the “big US firms” if we do not
control for diversification and sales. This fact also suggests a potential difference in the determinants of the
patent sleeping likelihood between “big US firms” and the rest of patentholders.
(39) Again, this effect seems to be due to the sample attrition. When we run Model 4 without including sales
and diversification, the interaction is significant only at a 12% confidence level. In Model 5 it is not
significant either with its inclusion or without it. 
(40) The reverse is not necessarily true. The firm may just select among its sleeping patents the ones that are
most likely to be licensed in order to offer them in the web-based marketplace. However, we do not believe
this to be the case, because, if they actually are sleeping patents, firms have nothing to lose by posting them
in the web marketplace. Our findings suggest that, controlling for firm and other patent characteristics, an
invention’s strategic fit with the firm’s strategy and an invention’s degree of innovativeness
positively affect the invention’s sleeping likelihood. More interestingly, a patent’s sleeping
likelihood also depends positively on the interaction between these two dimensions. Thus, a
more innovative patent is more likely to remain sleeping the less well it fits with the firm’s
core business. And a better fitting patent is more likely to remain sleeping the less radical it
is. Some of these results, in particular the result on the innovativeness dimension, are in line
with the results from previous literature, which has found that more innovative projects are
more likely to be rejected by established firms. However, our findings suggest that this is
particularly the case the further away from the firm’s core the invention is. Rejections at the
firm’s core are of less innovative patented projects. Therefore, it is not that established firms
do not undertake innovate ideas but rather that they let pass by innovative ideas that do not fit
exactly with their core (at least, that is the case with patent-protected projects). Another
interesting result, though not so robust, is the positive effect of the scope dimension on the
sleeping  likelihood.  Scope  is  a  very  controversial  patent  characteristic.  Previous  findings
suggest that it is a very valuable characteristic for patentholders, but some literature suggests
that it may introduce some market inefficiencies. Our results suggest that, in fact, broader
patents are more likely to remain (partially) sleeping. Surprisingly, we do not find conclusive
evidence  that  sleeping  patents  are  significantly  less  important  than  non-sleeping  ones,
contrary to our initial beliefs but consistent with the rest of our results.  
We believe these findings to be relevant. They suggest two important facts. First,
sleeping patents do not appear to be marginal patents. They are innovative and broad and are
not considered significantly less important by the scientific community. Second, firms seem
to have a propensity to patent not just what they want to bring to market but any of their
research  results,  both  in  their  core  and  non-core  areas  (especially  patent-intensive  firms,
which have a low marginal cost when applying for an additional patent). Given that there is
no requirement to put a patent to work in a certain number of years, many firms apply for
patents without taking into account the probability of using them. This behavior results in a
large amount of patent-protected inventions that lie forgotten on firm’s shelves and never
reach the market or, even worse, are reinvented by others, who cannot develop them because
the patent blocks the area. Moreover, firms do not realise that their un(der)used patents might
be valuable in other hands or for other uses, as our findings suggest. This is something that
large, patent-intensive firms, with the help of consultant firms, are beginning to realize and
implement by hiring broad-based technologists who can help to identify potential uses for a
technology across industries. However, even if firms are aware of potential applications for
their underused inventions, they are reluctant to incur the costs of searching for potential
partners. At the heart of these problems is the lack of markets for intellectual property. If such
markets existed, firms’ underused technologies, technical problems with no solution, and
capital would find each other and efficient deals would be struck. 
Further research should focus more deeply on the characteristics and determinants of
sleeping patents. In particular, it would be worth further analyzing firm characteristics that
may affect the propensity to shelve patents.
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